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INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
INC., a Utah corporation,
d/b/a LDS HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14690

-vsINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
and MARY JEAN ORTEGA,
Defendants.
•

0000O0000

•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ORIGINAL ACTION TO REVIEW THE PROCEEDINGS AND
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a temporary order of the Industrial Commission of Utah awarding workmen1s compensation benefits
to claimant Mary Jean Ortega against petitioner Intermountain
Health Care, Inc.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The claim of defendant Ortega against plaintiff was
heard by the defendant Commission, after which Mrs. Ortega
appeared before a medical panel which subsequently issued a
report.

Based on the report, the Industrial Commission issued

a temporary order, subsequently amended, which awarded temporary
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total disability payments and medical payments to defendant
Ortega pending a final determination on the issue of permanent
partial disability,
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT
Respondent seeks affirmance of the orders issued by
respondent Industrial Commission of Utah appealed in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Claimant Mary Jean Ortega was employed by petitioner
Intermountain Health Care (hereafter Intermountain) as a laborer
in the laundry operation of the LDS Hospital when she strained
her back lifting large laundry bags on the evening of November 11,
1970.

She had been so employed for approximately two years prior

to this injury.

Following the accident, Mrs. Ortega undertook a

full course of treatment at Intermountainfs facilities for the
physical aspects of the injury, and no claim relating to this
therapy is presented herein.

The source of the dispute underly-

ing this appeal concerns a psychological complication that
developed subsequent to the injury known as a "functional overlay".

In Mrs. Ortega's case it involves a continuation and

increase in the pain that originally attended the physical
injury.

Regarding this condition, the physician treating Mrs.

Ortega's physical injury submitted the following comment to
Intermountain's insurance adjuster:
"... a certainly large amount of her pain is
psychological in origin. This does not mean that it
does not seem to be real to her. She will not return
to work. These are always difficult problems, espe-

-2-
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cially since the patient probably will not get well
with ordinary physical means and psychological evaluation and counseling is indicated.M (emphasis added by
Industrial Commission)
In regard to the functional overlay problem, the
medical panel appointed by the Industrial Commission made a
preliminary finding that Mrs. Ortega was thirty per cent permanently partially disabled; ten per cent of which was a preexisting condition, with the remaining twenty per cent being
attributable to the accident of November 11th while working
for Intermountain.

Considering the medical panelTs report

along with the other evidence relating to the claimants condition, the Industrial Commission found that Mrs. Ortega was
temporarily totally disabled and is now permanently partially
disabled, although it expressly reserved a final determination
of the degree of permanent impairment pending the course of
psychiatric treatment which the medical panel indicated could
lead to a significant improvement in Mrs. OrtegaTs condition.
Accordingly, the Industrial Commission entered an order directing Intermountain to pay Mrs. Ortega a sum for temporary total
disability until her psychiatrist releases her as fit for work,
and a sum for treatment of the psychological disability excluding
that relating to family or marital counseling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED AS AMENDED 1953, 35-1-69 DOES NOT
REQUIRE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPORTION THE COSTS OF
TREATMENT IN THE MANNER REQUESTED BY INTERMOUNTAIN.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The case law interpreting U.C.A. 35-1-69 has not
held that the Industrial Commission must apportion the costs
of its award in cases such as presented here.

As authority

for its decision, the Industrial Commission cited the case
of Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d
740 (1967).

The plaintiff there was a fireman who had a pre-

existing heart ailment which developed into a severe anginal
attack while on route to a fire.

The Commission denied Powers

claim for compensation on the grounds that no compensible industrial accident had occurred.

In holding that the incident

of claimant's anginal attack was an industrial accident, this
court stated at page 743, of 427 P.2d:
Tf

The law is well settled that the aggravation
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is compensible and that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the course
of employment may be an accident within the meaning
of the act." (Citing Jones v. California Packing
Corporation, 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; and Purity
Biscut Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1,
201 P.2d 961).
Intermountain argues that the Powers case is inapposite
because it does not discuss the issue of apportionment but instead
turns solely on the question of whether an aggravated injury is
compensible.

At page 4 of its brief, petitioner insists that Mrs.

Ortega makes no argument that this is an aggravation of a preexisting problem.

Petition then argues that even if applicable,

the holding in Powers is that the aggravation alone is compensible,
not the pre-existing difficulty.
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Petitioner's argument attempting to distinguish the
Powers case is clearly inaccurate.

First the medical board's

findings are that of Mrs. Ortega's thirty per cent psychological
disability, ten per cent is attributable to pre-existing factors.
Petitioner so states at pages 4, 5 and 6 of its brief.

Moreover,

Intermountain's primary argument in this appeal is that it
should have to pay only for a portion of claimant's psychological
disability because part of it existed prior to employment.
If the condition existed to a certain extent prior to the accident, then it is necessarily true that the subsequent injury
aggravated it.
Second, nowhere in the Powers opinion does this court
say that in cases where pre-existing conditions are aggravated
there must be apportionment of damages since the employer is
liable only to the degree to which the preceding condition
was aggravated.

In fact, the opinion states only that the

Industrial Commission's Order denying Powers claim is reversed
and on remand the Industrial Commission found Powers one hundred per
cent disabled and assessed all liability against the employer
without any apportionment.

(See Order of July 13, 1967).

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the Powers case is
largely determinative of the issues presented in this appeal.
Like Powers, Mrs. Ortega came to* work with a condition that
rendered her abnormally sensitive to the type of injury she
sustained, but which did not effect her job performance prior

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1
to the injury itself.

Actually, Mrs. Ortega's case is even

stronger on the facts than Powers since his pre-existing heart

g

condition was so severe that it was triggered by the normal
stresses of the job and not by a separate accident.

In addition,

the Industrial Commission follows the Powers case in measuring

4

the amount of compensible aggravation by comparing Mrs. OrtegaTs
present condition against the degree of her disablement prior
to the injury of November 11th.

In this regard, disability

4

can be measured by two different standards of which the medical
panel's findings is one and the other is the more practical
and concrete consideration of how much one's capacity to work
is limited before and after the injury.

4

This clearly is the

standard applied by this court in Powers in measuring the degree
of aggravation.

In adopting this second standard for measuring

<

compensation, this court and the Industrial Commission have
interpreted 35-1-69 to apply only when the disability operates
as a measurable handicap upon one's ability to work at the
time the individual commences employment.

<

Therefore, unless

Intermountain can show that Mrs. Ortega's work performance
was ten per cent deficient prior to the accident, they cannot
claim the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in ordering Intermountain to pay all costs of Mrs. Ortega's psychological treatment.
The case of McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 551 P.2d
504 (Utah 1976), cited by petitioner, provides additional authority
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!

for application of the work comparison standard by disallowing
the use of a percentage based finding - such as that produced
by the Industrial Commission's medical panel - in a case where
the Industrial Commission's award was apportioned between the
employer and the State's Special Injury Fund under provisions
of 3 5-1-69.
Furthermore, the Industrial Commission has apportioned the expenses relating to treatment of Mrs. Ortega's
functional overlay disability, only it has done so according
to the work disability comparison standard and in a manner
consistent with this court's command in McPhie.

It did so

by specifically excluding from Intermountain's liability any
counseling related to family or marital problems.

Such domestic

difficulties were identified by the treating psychiatrist as
the other significant aspect of claimant's psychological problems.

Thus, the Commission has not placed on Intermountain

any liability which does not relate in some manner to the injury
resulting from Mrs. Ortega's employment.
Finally, it is important to note that the Industrial
Commission's findings in respect to Mrs. Ortega's disabilities
are not final.

As was mentioned previously, due to the strong

potential for improvement in her psychiatric profile as treatment proceeds, the present finding of thirty per cent functional
disability will likely be revised downward in the future.
It is entirely plausible that the ultimate finding would be
that claimant is ten per cent disabled, which disability relates
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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only to domestic factors, and which presents no immediate impairment of Mrs. Ortega's ability to work, and so release petitioner
from further liability.

Intermountain is thus jumping the

gun in claiming that it has been saddled with an unfair final
order since that order is subject to continuous review and
modification.

Regardless of what the final order of the Indus-

trial Commission finds, Intermountain at present is being ordered
to pay only for treatment of Mrs. Ortega1s perception of pain,
liability for which it is clearly in no position to deny.
Intermountain cites Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1974); and Halvorson, Inc. v. Williams,
19 Utah 2d 113, 426 P.2d 1019 (1967) for the proposition that
this court denies apportionment only when it finds no pre-existing conditions.

However, these cases turn solely on the question

of whether the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily in finding
that there was no pre-existing disability based on the evidence
presented in each case.

Since the Commission's orders, not

its findings of fact, are at issue in the instant case, these
cases are inmaterial.

More importantly, contrary to petitioner's

claim this court and the Industrial Commission have previously
refused apportionment in the presence of a finding of pre-existing
disability.

See Duane Brown Chevrolet Company v. Industrial Com-

mission, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 (1973), and Mountain States
Steel Company v. Industrial Commission, 535 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1975).
In each of these cases awards of total liability against an employer for injuries which only aggravated prior conditions were ..
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upheld by this court over an appeal for apportionment by the respective employers.

In light of these cases the Industrial Com-

mission's award in Mrs, Ortega's case is clearly neither arbitrary
nor contrary to law,
POINT II
CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY
PAYMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF MEDICAL TREATMENT.
The Industrial Commission's order directed petitioner
to continue paying temporary total disability compensation
to Mrs. Ortega "... until claimant is released for work activities
..." (Finding of Fact No. 5, Industrial Commission Order of
April 2, 1976).

Mrs. Ortega has not yet been released for

work activities by her treating psychiatrist.
Petitioner asserts that since Mrs. Ortega has been
transferred from in-patient to out-patient status, and a finding has been made in respect to permanent partial disability,
that she can no longer be considered totally disabled.
aspects of the preceding argument are clearly in error.

Both
First,

a transfer from in-patient to out-patient status in no way
implies that the patient is no longer totally disabled.

Many

conditions which would undeniably be considered totally disabling
can be treated on an out-patient basis.

Intermountain should

be well aware of this since it is itself a health care organization.

Continuous hospitalization would be absolutely neces-

sary only if Mrs. Ortega were completely psychotic or otherwise
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incapable of assuming any responsibility for her behavior.
That is not the case here; Mrs. Ortega's symptoms are chronic
severe pain.

Mrs. Ortega was transferred from in-patient to

out-patient status because she found the environment of the
psychiatric ward at the University Medical Center so intolerable
that it aggravated her condition.
Intermountain's claim that a finding of permanent
partial disability implies a condition sufficiently stabilized
that it can no longer be termed totally disabled is equally
illogical.

It need only be pointed out again that the finding

of the medical panel as to permanent partial disability is
a tentative conclusion, expressly set for reconsideration as
psychiatric treatment progresses.

Claimant's condition can

therefore hardly be termed stabilized.
The central issue here is whether Mrs. Ortega is
capable of returning to work at this time.
trist indicates she is not.

Her treating psychia-

Petitioner has presented no evidence

to challenge the doctor's conclusion.

Therefore, the Industrial

Commission's finding that Mrs. Ortega continues to be totally
disabled and ordering payments accordingly is neither arbitary
nor capricious.
POINT III
IT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW FOR THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO ORDER TREATMENT WITHOUT SPECIFYING A LIMIT ON COSTS
FROM THE OUTSET.

.-10-
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As a practical matter, the Industrial Commission is
unable in many cases to fix the costs of rehabilitation and
treatment for the injuries involved.

Accordingly, in modern

practice the Industrial Commission specifies the type of treatment required but not necessarily the costs unless they can be
accurately determined at that time.
be a pointless effort.

To require otherwise would

The expenses incurred are determined by

those individuals and organizations which provide the treatment.
Having the Industrial Commission declare a sum beforehand would
have no effect on these costs.

Secondly, if a sum were set ini-

tially, the Commission would just continue to adjust it to reflect the real costs as treatment proceeded.

Specific authority

to make such continuing adjustments is conferred on the Commission by U.C.A. 35-1-78 (as amended 1953).
Petitioner cites Carbon Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 156, 17 P.2d 215 (1932) as authority for the requirement upon the Commission to state a final cost of treatment
in its original order. - That case interpreted a statute which is
the present day 35-1-81.

However, as written in 1932 this act

stated a limit on benefits and investigatory requirements in
relation any final awards in excess of $500.00 which have since
been repealed.

The holding in this case was basically tied in

with the courtfs interpretation of the demand the legislature
intended to impose on the Industrial Commission by these provisions since repealed.

The case, therefore, has little con-

tinuing validity.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Of course, even under the new law the Industrial Commission cannot cease supervising the expenses incurred in treatment of Mrs. Ortega's condition.

A similar situation resulting

in this court finding a requirement of continuing supervision
was presented in Utah Construction Company v. Matheson, 534
P.2d 1238 (1975).

i

However, an order specifying just such super-

vision was entered by the Industrial Commission in its supple(

mental order of June 21, 1976.
The Industrial Commission's award in Mrs. Ortega's
case is in full compliance with U.C.A. 35-1-81, the law in
force today, and the requirements of continuing supervision

i

over longterm medical treatment stated in the Utah Construction
case, supra, and, therefore, should be sustained by this court.
CONCLUSION

I

In reviewing any order of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, this court must find that the Commission's action was sufficiently arbitrary and capricious to amount to an abuse of its discretion before it may overturn that order.

•

In this case, the peti-

tioner, Intermountain Health Care, has presented no evidence of
any such abuse of discretion.

It has failed to show that the In-

*

dustrial Commission's interpretation of U.C.A. 35-1-69 is incompatible with that act or inconsistent with this court's interpretation of that act.

In addition, there is substantial evidence in

the record that the Industrial Commission's order was specifically
patterned after cases decided by this court interpreting Section
35-1-69 of the Utah Code.

Petitioner Intermountain has likewise

-12-
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*

failed to produce any plausible evidence that the Commission abused
its discretionary duties in awarding Mrs, Ortega temporary total
disability benefits during the period her treating r>hysician has
not released her for work.

Finally, petitioner Intermountain has

failed to produce any evidence or case authority that the Commission is not empowered to provide for long term medical treatment
of a condition without specifying the ultimate cost of that treatment.

In fact, there is substantial evidence and case authority

for the opposite claim, namely, that so long as the Industrial Commission supervises the long term medical treatment of a party eligible for workmen's compensation benefits it may enter its
order without specifying ultimate costs.

To require otherwise

would merely impose an impractical burden on the Industrial
Commission which would ultimately have no effect whatsoever
on the final costs of treatment.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT W. BRANDT
Attorney for Claimant Mary Jean
Ortega
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